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Abstract 
The renewables sector and particularly offshore wind 
energy is a fast developing industry over the last few 
years. Especially activities related to the Installation, 
Operation and Maintenance (O&M) of offshore wind 
turbines becomes a challenging task with inherent risks. 
This paper assesses the risks related to the above stages 
of a wind farm lifecycle using the FMECA (Failure 
Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis) and HAZID 
(Hazard Identification) methods. The full-scale offshore 
installation and O&M tasks are considered together 
with the wind turbine main components. An integrated 
risk analysis methodology is presented addressing 
personnel Safety (S), Environmental impact (E), Asset 
integrity (A) and Operation (O). The above is 
supplemented by a cost analysis with the aid of BBN 
(Bayesian Belief Networks) method in order to assist the 
decision making process related to installation and 
O&M tasks. All major risks and critical wind turbine 
components are identified as well as measures are 
suggested in order to prevent or mitigate them. 
Moreover, a thorough inspection and maintenance plan 
can be elaborated for the mentioned activities. 
Keywords: Risk analysis (O&M); Offshore wind 
farm; FMECA; HAZID; BBN 
1. Introduction 
Wind power is known to humans since ancient times. It 
is a form of energy that not only has no time or place 
restrictions but it also contributes in reducing 
greenhouse gases emission and busting the economy of 
countries that depend on oil and gas imports for the 
energy coverage (Ftenakis, Kim 2009). These 
characteristics makes it appealing to industry that tries 
to exploit it by developing more and more onshore or 
offshore wind farms (Windustry 2014).  
The rapidly expanding number of wind farms makes 
quantifying and managing the different elements of risk 
that are present in each of the instalment, operation and 
maintenance stages of a wind turbine necessary. In this 
respect, risk analysis and decision making can be a key 
that will enable fast growth, investments, further 
technological development and reasonable cost of 
energy. 
This paper presents the study regarding the investigation 
and assessment of the risk and reliability features of 
offshore wind turbines at different stages of its lifetime 
and identification of the critical components in terms of 
their operation in order to increase their availability and 
operability characteristics. A thorough review and 
examination of the past and current risk analysis 
methods in the offshore renewables and oil and gas 
sectors is carried out in section 2. The description of 
wind turbine with its components is explained and 
demonstrated in section 3, as well as the overall risk 
analysis methodology, including the HAZID and 
FMECA approaches, which are complemented with risk 
matrices for various consequence categories. Also, the 
cost benefit analysis with BBNs is presented in the same 
section. Section 4 presents the results of the analyses 
including the potential high-risk areas and the most 
costly components. The discussion, conclusions and 
future actions to be followed on the current study are 
finally shown in section 5. 
2. Literature Review 
The subject of risk analysis, risk assessment and overall 
risk management is a widely explored field with various 
studies contributing to its thorough examination. 
Effective risk mitigation is desirable by all individuals 
and companies, and risk management is or should be 
applied to all stages of a project lifetime. Especially in 
the maritime and offshore industry the aim is to reduce 
the risks from major hazards that could jeopardize the 
integrity of the offshore structure and the health and 
safety of the workforce and ensure the protection of the 
environment (Lazakis et al 2012). The correct 
identification of the hazards and their consequences is a 
key issue in providing information to aid decision 
making and increase the level of a project success. Thus 
there are many tools, processes, techniques and 
methodologies developed nowadays to cover this need.  
Indicatively mentioned are the following; Australian 
Standards/New Zealand Standards: 4360 (AS/NZS: 
4360, 2004), Association for Project Management 
(2004), Project Risk Analysis & Management (PRAM), 
Project Management Institute (2008), ISO/ IEC 31010 
(2009) standards.   
More specifically for offshore wind farms, the UK 
Health and Safety Executive (HSE) introduced the 
Safety Case approach in 1992 (HSE 2006), in which 
guidelines are given on what operators of each offshore 
installation need to do in order to “reduce the risks from 
major accident hazards to the health and safety of the 
workforce employed on offshore installations or in 
connected activities”. After that, many standards and 
codes have been established the last years as guidelines 
for this purpose. Although they refer mainly to the oil 
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industry, they can be also applied on wind industry. The 
most important standards are mentioned in BS/ISO 
standard 17776 (2002), HSE (2006), Det Norske Veritas 
(DNV 2001, 2003), International Maritime Organiastion 
(IMO, 2007), American Bureau of Shipping (ABS, 
2003), Offshore Reliability Database handbook 
(OREDA 2002) and Norsok (2013).  
Apart from standards there are various software tools 
for risk analysis valuable for the industry based on a 
quantitative approach of risk assessment. These are the 
RBM (Risk Based Management) II released from the 
Dutch Government, PHAST and Synergi Life Risk 
Management from DNVGL, SHEPHERD a software 
property of Shell Global Solutions, RISKCURVES that 
is an integrated Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) 
software from TNO, EFFECTS that is a consequence 
analysis and damage calculation software from the 
Dutch research organization TNO, HAMSAGARS 
which is another QRA software from HAMS-GPS, a 
quantitative risk analysis training software called 
RISKAN among others (Lewis, 2005). 
The most known techniques of hazard identification are 
Expert Judgment, Codes and Standards, Check Lists and 
the structured techniques HAZID (Hazard 
Identification), PHA (Process Hazard Analysis), What-
IF Method, FTA (Fault Tree Analysis), ETA (Event 
Tree Analysis), FMEA/FMECA (Failure Mode, Effects 
and Criticality Analysis), HAZOP (Hazard and 
Operability), Monte Carlo Simulation and Risk Ranking 
Matrix (Shafiee, Dinmohammadi 2014). All of them can 
be applied in our area of interest; offshore installations 
and more specifically offshore wind farms, with 
FMECA and HAZID, the two methods that are used in 
this study, being two of the most popular. 
After all the necessary information about possible risks 
is gathered, risk evaluation is executed. The most well-
known method of risk evaluation is ALARP (As Low 
As Reasonably Practical). The idea in this method is 
that the risk should be minimized to a point where it is 
acceptable but without expending grossly 
disproportionate cost, time and effort (Melchers 2001). 
Regarding decision making, in the frame of risk 
mitigation and ALARP, one of the strongest tools that 
decision makers have to front the problems raised is 
Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs) a tool for modeling 
under uncertainty by using conditional probabilistic 
calculations and graphical representation of the logical 
relationships between variables. 
All the above show in the most explicit way the 
development carried out in the offshore renewable field 
in the last few years as well as the promising outcomes 
to be generated in the near future. With all this in mind, 
the section that follows next presents the risk analysis 
methodology suggested for implementation on a wind 
farm. 
 
3. Methodology 
In this section of the paper, the suggested risk analysis 
methodology is presented. The first step is to 
decompose a wind turbine and identify its main 
components as well as the activity areas that we are 
interested in. The next stage is the determination of the 
acceptance criteria, so that the results of the risk 
analysis are compared with some predefined standards. 
After this stage, the risk analysis’ main part takes place. 
At first hazard identification and hazard assessment is 
done. Then the risk management is conducted, where 
the potential hazards have to be eliminated or prevented 
from occurring, and the effects have to be mitigated. 
These actions can be done by adopting the proper pro-
active measures which will be later assessed regarding 
their cost-benefit value on whether they will be applied 
or not. This decision is then used as a feedback to the 
risk analysis in order to improve the procedure. More 
specifically, after the first step a set of sixteen sub-
assemblies and main parts was extracted (Table 1). 
Later on, the activity areas that we are interested in are 
identified and more specifically installation, operation 
and maintenance of an offshore wind turbine. Keeping 
these in mind we can now proceed with the risk 
identification using FMECA and HAZID methods. With 
the FMECA we identified the most critical components 
of a wind turbine since this method reviews the ways in 
which a system can fail and then the consequences of 
these failures.   
Table 1: Components of a wind turbine 
Systems Components 
Brake system Brake disk, Spring, Motor 
Cables  
Gearbox 
Toothed gear wheels, 
Pump, Oil heater/cooler, 
Hoses 
Generator 
High speed shaft, 
Bearings, Rotor, Stator, 
Coil 
Main frame  
Main shaft 
Low speed shaft, High 
speed shaft, Bearings, 
Couplings 
Nacelle housing Nacelle 
Pitch system Pitch motor, Gears 
Power converter Power electronic switch, 
cable, DC bus 
Rotor bearings  
Rotor blades Blades 
Rotor hub Hub, Air brake 
Screws  
Tower Tower, Foundation 
Transformer Controllers 
Yaw system Yaw drive, Yaw motor 
 
A consequence as well as a probability Table is 
developed showing the various levels of consequence, 
probability and detection rankings accordingly. For the 
consequence table we will evaluate the hazards and rank 
them into five categories that in our case, for 
computational reasons, will be represented from 
numbers 1 to 5 representing: 1 (minor), 2 (marginal), 3 
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(major), 4 (critical) and 5 (catastrophic). It can be 
assumed here that one major injury is equal to 10 minor 
injuries while one fatality is equal to 10 major injuries. 
As far as the probability ranking is concerned, this is 
divided into five categories as explained in the previous 
chapter: 1 (extremely unlikely), 2 (remote), 3 
(occasional), 4 (probable) and 5 (very frequent). Also, 
the detection index that shows how likely is for the 
design system to identify any possible hazards is 
divided into five categories: 1 (almost impossible), 2 
(low), 3 (moderate), 4 (high), 5 (almost certain). The 
Risk Priority Number (RPN) can also be calculated as a 
product of the probability index, the detection index and 
the severity index. In this way we can create risk levels 
out of the possible outcomes that vary from low to high 
and are illustrated with a range of different colors as in 
Table 2. 
Table 2: Risk index table 
Risk index table 
Low (negligible risk) 
Moderate (tolerable risk) 
Significant (tolerable, specific measures in place) 
High (intolerable risk) 
 
The consequence, probability, detection and 
consecutively risk and RPN index are examined in 
terms of Personnel safety (S), Environmental protection 
(E), Asset integrity (A) and Device operation (O). 
Finally a risk matrix is formed as shown in Table 4 
where the potential risks and failure modes of the sub-
assemblies are identified. The HAZID method is used to 
identify the potential hazards during manufacture, 
transportation, installation, operation and maintenance. 
These hazards can be directly related to the turbines, 
such as lifting operations and occupational dangers, or 
indirectly, for example bad weather or fire. We repeat 
the same procedure for the HAZID method with the 
difference that a Risk Index instead of the RPN Index is 
now calculated. The form of the matrix is used shown in 
Table 5.  
For a complete representation of all the potential risks 
involved in these activities, the direct as well as the 
indirect hazards are analyzed. Direct hazards involve the 
ones directly related to the wind turbine such as lifting 
operations, occupational and health hazards, operation 
of ROVs (Remotely Operated Vehicles) etc. Indirect 
hazards involve the ones related to the overall 
installation activity including the installation vessel and 
its crew (e.g. fire on board the vessel, hot weather, etc.). 
After the identification and assessment of the potential 
hazards, the risk management stage takes place. In this 
case, the higher ranked risks are dealt with in terms of 
designing-out the potential hazards in the initial stages 
of the wind turbine, preventing the hazards from 
occurring, mitigating the effects of the hazards in case 
they occur or finally be pro-active for emergency 
response actions. Finally, a cost benefit analysis of the 
repair costs based on the output of the risk assessment 
will be carried out. This will be done using Bayesian 
Belief Networks with the aid of HUGIN software. 
4. Results 
In this section of the present paper, the results of the 
FMECA, HAZID and BBN analysis are shown. It is 
important to mention that for the presentation of the 
highest-ranked critical components and hazards that 
originated from the FMECA and HAZID analysis, not 
only those with the highest RPN or Risk Index are 
mentioned but also those with lower indices but severe 
consequences like multiple injuries, fatalities or collapse 
of the systems. 
4.1 FMECA Results 
After ranking the components in terms of Safety, Asset, 
Environment and Operation, based on their RPN, as 
shown for example in Table 5, we can summarize the 
results in one total ranking of components as well as 
their RPN Index: 
Table 3: FMECA analysis-Ranking of components in   
terms of Asset 
Ranking in terms of Asset Max RPN 
Pitch system    40  
Yaw system 24 
Rotor blades 18 
Cables 18 
Gearbox failure 18 
Tower failure 16 
Foundation 12 
Main frame 12 
Transformer 12 
Rotor hub 12 
Power generation system 12 
 
The basic results obtained from the analysis performed 
are as follows: 
¾ The most sensitive component of the wind turbine 
in terms of Safety is Tower as the consequences of 
a potential collapse would be catastrophic in case 
of fatalities. Furthermore, the absence of sensors at 
the tower increases the possibility of undetected 
flaws that could lead to a possible failure 
compared to other components. 
¾ Foundation is the most failure prone component of 
the wind turbine in terms of Environment since 
foundation is in close contact with the sea and the 
seabed and again there is lack of sensors. 
¾ As far as Asset is concerned, the most sensitive 
component of the wind turbine is Pitch system not 
only due to high probability of failure but also 
because its failure means low energy production 
and thus less money earned for the company. 
¾ Pitch system is the most susceptible component of 
the wind turbine in terms of Operation for the 
same reasons. 
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¾ In total, we can say that the most critical 
component of an offshore wind turbine based on 
FMECA is the pitch system, due to high 
probability index. It is common that electrical 
equipment is more sensitive to failure than the 
mechanical components. This is followed by rotor 
blades and foundation that have a high RPN due to 
high consequence index since a potential failure of 
the blades will have an impact on the energy 
production and a failure of the foundation can 
eventually lead to fatalities.  
4.2 HAZID Results 
As far as the HAZID analysis is concerned again the 
hazards are evaluated in terms of Safety, Asset, 
Environment and Operation and summarized for each 
category. An example of risk evaluation regarding the 
transportation stage is shown next (risk indexes shown 
in brackets).  
During the transportation process: 
o In Safety terms,  
 collision between CTV (Crew Transfer 
Vehicles) and FSV (Field Support Vessels) or 
wind turbines during worker’s transportation 
due to bad weather (36) or human error (24) 
 load falls during unload due to bad weather 
(27), human error (24), or poor communication 
between workers. (24) 
o In terms of Environment, 
 load falls during unload due to poor 
communication between workers (24) 
o In Asset terms,  
 load falls during unload due to poor 
communication between workers (24) and  bad 
weather (27) 
 collision between FSV and Jack-up vessels 
during component transportation due to bad 
weather conditions (24) and human error (24) 
 collision between FSV and Jack-up vessels or 
wind turbines during component transportation 
due to bad weather conditions (24) and human 
error (24) 
 collision between helicopter and wind turbine 
during component transportation due to bad 
weather conditions (24) and human error (24) 
o In Operation terms,  
 collision between FSV and Jack-up vessels 
during component transportation due to bad 
weather conditions (24) and human error (24) 
 collision between FSV and Jack-up vessels or 
wind turbines during component transportation 
due to bad weather conditions (24) and human 
error (24) 
 collision between helicopter and wind turbine 
during component transportation due to bad 
weather conditions (24) and human error (24) 
The risks that are present in each of the wind farm’s life 
stages can be summarized as follows: 
¾ In the case of manufacturing, it is observed that 
the biggest hazard is electrical shock since most 
of the manufacturing processes are automated 
and electricity is the only source of hazard that 
workers may come in touch with. 
¾ In the case transportation is concerned it is seen 
that collision between means of transportation is 
the most common hazard as a great number of 
transportation means is used. 
¾ During the installation process the major hazards 
regard safety as it is the only stage of a turbine’s 
life that a large number of workers are involved. 
¾ Weather conditions, are the main failure causes 
during the operation process. Weather is a 
considerable risk factor as all assembly 
techniques can only be done in calm sea. Work 
becomes extremely difficult or dangerous in 
rough sea and project delays may occur. These 
temporary interruptions of work mean huge 
increases in the construction cost of offshore 
wind farms 
¾ In the case of maintenance it is noticed that most 
of the hazards are in common with the 
installation stage. 
4.3 BBN Results 
BBN can be quite complex and it may be necessary to 
break it down to subcategories as shown in Figure 1. In 
this case, we avoid computational intensive and time 
consuming process. In our approach we divided the 
main system into 11 subsystems as mentioned in Table 
6. When necessary, in complicated systems, a further 
division was made to simplify the calculations into 
categories such as electrical failure, structural failure, 
human error and external parameters. Through this 
process we identified and ranked the most critical 
components and their probability of failure. In the final 
stages of our approach we incorporated the cost estimate 
for each component in order to get an approximation of 
the total cost in case of failure. 
Table 4: BBN analysis-Failure probabilities of the 
components 
Ranking of components Failure probability 
Yaw system 0.4336 
Rotor blades 0.336 
Power generation system 0.3074 
Gearbox 0.2937 
Foundation 0.2895 
Pitch system 0.2687 
Main frame 0.2547 
Transformer 0.2146 
Rotor hub 0.1585 
Cables 0.1405 
Tower 0.136 
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Table 5: Part of FMECA Matrix 
 
Table 6: Part of the HAZID Matrix 
Undesired event/Hazard Cause Consequences
Risk control 
options/ 
measures
S E A O S E A O S E A O S E A O
1.Brakesystemfailure
Breakingpowerlost
fromoverheatingof
themetalinbrake
rotorsordrums
Systemdisruption,blade
damage,fireorshutdown
2 1 3 3 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 6 3 9 9
Properdesign,
monitoringand
inspection
Brakedamagedueto
greaseoroilonbrakes
Systemdisruption,blade
damage,fireorshutdown
2 1 3 3 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 6 3 9 9
Properdesign,
monitoringand
inspection
Breakingpowerloss
duetobrakepads
wearingthin
Systemdisruption,blade
damage,fireorshutdown
2 1 3 3 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 6 3 9 9
Properdesign,
monitoringand
inspection
Consequence 
index
Probability 
index
Detection 
index
RPN
Undesired
event/Hazard
Cause Consequences
Riskcontrol
options/measures
S E A O S E A O S E A O S E A O
Electricalhazard Equipmentfailure Injuriesorfatalities 4 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 24 2 2 2
Proper
maintenanceofthe
equipment
Humanerror Injuriesorfatalities 4 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 36 3 3 3
Appropriate
trainingandproper
restbeforethe
startoftheshift
InadequatePPE Injuriesorfatalities 4 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 16 2 2 2
Regularchecksof
properuseofPPE
andproper
informationabout
theirutility
Poor
communication
between
coworkers
Injuriesorfatalities 4 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 24 3 3 3 Appropriate
training
Hearingproblems
Extensivenoise
fromthe
equipment
Deafnessordizziness 3 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 18 2 2 2 UseofproperPPE
InadequatePPE Deafnessordizziness 3 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 12 2 2 2
Regularchecksof
properuseofPPE
andproper
informationabout
theirutility
Consequenceindex Probabilityindex Detectionindex Riskindex
MANUFACTURINGPROCESS
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For the Wind turbine as a total we can summarize the 
following after implementing the cost data for the 
components into the BBN network (Lazakis et al 2013, 
Dalgic et al 2013, Fingersh et al 2006). 
Table 7: Summary of the results for the wind turbine 
Wind turbine 
Total probability of failure 0.6098 
Total cost in case of failure 115,398.75$ 
Total gain in case of not failure 67,985.37$ 
For each one of the components, given that they fail, we 
can see in Figure 1 the top failure modes for the 
foundation component analytically as they came out from 
the HUGIN program. Here we present the ranked failure 
modes for the most critical component: 
Table 8: Failure modes and probabilities for the yaw 
system 
Yaw system 
Insufficient torque to drive motor from 
internal leakage or valve failure 0.425 
Failure to pinion rotation from blockage 
or foreign object between gear teeth, 
sheared shaft or cracked pinion housing 
and bearing 
0.0424 
 
So in total we can summarize the following regarding the 
BBN analysis: 
¾ The values used in the calculations are taken 
from the OREDA Handbook that it is more 
specifically for oil and gas industry. Since 
offshore wind turbines are a relatively new 
way of producing energy there is a lack of 
accurate data regarding risk and criticality 
analysis so there is a parameter of error in the 
calculations. 
¾ The system with the highest failure probability 
is yaw system and is followed by rotor blades 
and power generation system. At some point 
this is justified as all of them are electrical 
systems and they are more sensitive to failures 
than mechanical systems or structures. 
¾ The overall failure probability of the wind 
turbine is relatively high. This can be due to 
data error since the values are taken from the 
OREDA handbook which is more specifically 
used for oil and gas industry. 
¾ The overall cost of the wind turbine in case of 
failure is relatively low comparing to the 
components’ costs respectively, since the top 
critical subsystems are relatively cheap. 
¾ The ranking of the critical components verifies 
at a satisfactory level the results of the HUGIN 
program in comparison with FMECA analysis. 
Yaw system, power generation system and 
gearbox are in both ranking amongst the first 
places. One major difference is the position of 
pitch system that is on the top of one list and 
rather low at the other. 
5. Conclusions 
Reliability prediction is considered as a crucial 
measure to understand system performance for 
minimizing maintenance cost and mitigate 
unnecessary downtime. In addition, imperfect 
maintenance is identified as one of the typical 
drawbacks in operation and maintenance practices 
that reduce system reliability. In this work we used a 
combined research methodology for the risk analysis 
and the prediction of the long-term reliability of an 
offshore wind turbine’s sub-systems. The key 
elements carried out and presented in this report are 
the following: 
 
• Review of risk analysis and risk assessment 
methods and tools in the renewables, maritime 
and other industrial sectors 
• Presentation of a risk analysis and decision 
making methodology to be followed for the 
offshore wind turbine 
• A novel technique for predicting system 
reliability is provided through this approach by 
using HAZID, FMECA and BBN analysis. 
• Development of a thorough risk matrix to be 
used for the installation, operation and 
maintenance activities of the wind turbine as 
well as for the critical components.  
• Identification of the hazards in the installation, 
operation and maintenance activities of the 
turbine.  
• Identification of the high-ranked hazardous 
areas for the mentioned activities and 
components. 
• Identification of the most costly components of 
a wind turbine. 
 
In addition to the above, the research study conducted 
herein provides a rigid foundation for expanding into 
further research in the mentioned areas. The main 
recommendation that may enhance the proposed 
methodology is a further investigation in order to 
gather more accurate information about the offshore 
industry since implementation of the onshore data can 
lead to significant errors. Furthermore, more 
maintenance details could be implemented in the 
BBN networks so that more informative and proper 
decisions can be made on behalf of the decision 
makers about the maintenance strategy. In order to 
obtain more realistic reliability result it is also 
suggested that the different kinds of maintenance 
strategy (i.e. planned, preventive, corrective, 
breakdown) is taken into consideration. 
Also, BBN analysis could be implemented for the 
HAZID analysis as well, so that the costs, in case the 
most critical operations occur, could be calculated. 
Finally, Future research could include a more 
elaborate, sophisticated risk based analysis 
considering the explicit formulation of a numerical 
optimization problem to be solved for the global 
minimum (optimal solution). Further, the time 
dependent character of the problem would be 
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explicitly considered by modeling the involved 
dynamics via non- stationary stochastic processes(Au 
& Beck, 2001), (Kougioumtzoglou, Spanos 2013), 
(Kougioumtzoglou, Spanos 2014). 
References 
ABS (2003) “Guide for risk evaluations for the 
classification of marine-related facilities”, Publication 
117, Houston 
AS/NZS: 4360, (2004), “The Australian and New 
Zealand Standard on Risk Management”, 3rd edition. 
Australian and New Zealand Standard  
Association for Project Management (2004), “Project 
Risk Analysis and Management (PRAM) Guide (2nd 
Edition)”, Princes Risborough, UK: Association for 
Project Management 
Au S.K., Beck J.L., (2001), “First excursion probabilities 
for linear systems by very efficient importance 
sampling”, Probabilistic Engineering Mechanics 16, 
193-207 
BS/ISO (2002) “Petroleum and natural gases industries-
Offshore production installations-Guidelines on tools 
and techniques for hazard identification and risk 
assessment”, BS/ISO standard 17776, Brussels, 2002 
Dalgic, Y., Lazakis, I. & Turan, O (2013). Vessel charter 
rate estimation for offshore wind O&M activities, 
15th Congress of Intl. Maritime Assoc. of 
Mediterranean (IMAM), 14-18 October, A Coruna, 
Spain. 
DNV (2001) “Marine risk assessment”, Offshore 
technology report prepared for the UK HSE, London 
DNV (2003) “Risk management in marine and subsea 
operations”, RP-H101, Hovik, Norway 
Fthenakis V.; Kim H. C. (2009). "Land use and electricity 
generation: A life-cycle analysis". Renewable and 
Sustainable Energy Reviews 13 (6–7): 1465.   
HSE (2006) “Assessment principles for offshore Safety 
Case”, HSE publications, London 
IMO “Formal Safety Assessment (FSA): Consolidated 
text of the guidelines for Formal Safety Assessment 
(FSA) for use in the IMO rule-making process”, 
MSC/Circ. 1023, 2007 
International Organization for Standardization ISO /IEC 
31010:2009. 2009, “Risk management – Risk 
assessment techniques”, Geneva, Switzerland: 
International Organization for Standardization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kougioumtzoglou A. Ioannis, Spanos D. Pol (2014), 
“Survival Probability Determination of Nonlinear 
Oscillators Subject to Evolutionary Stochastic 
Excitation”, Journal of Applied Mechanics, 
ASME, May 2014, Vol. 81 
Kougioumtzoglou A. Ioannis, Spanos D. Pol, (2013), 
“Response and First-Passage Statistics of 
Nonlinear”, Journal of Engineering Mechanics, 
ASCE / September 2013, 139:1207-1217 
L. Fingersh, M. Hand, and A. Laxson, “Wind turbine 
Design Cost and Scaling Model”, 2006 
Lazakis I., Turan O. and Rosendahl T., 2013. 
Modelling of vessel and equipment cost for the 
maintenance activities of an offshore tidal energy 
array, Proceedings of the PRADS2013, 20-25 
October, 2013, CECO, Changwon City, Korea. 
Lazakis, I., Turan, O., & Rosendahl T. (2012), “Risk 
assessment for the installation and maintenance 
activities of a low-speed tidal energy converter”, 
In Marine & Offshore Renewable Energy 2012, 
Royal Institution of Naval Architects) 
Lewis S., (2005), “An Overview of Leading Software 
Tools for QRA”, American Society of Safety 
Engineers –Middle East Chapter (161), 7th 
Professional Development Conference & 
Exhibition, March 18-22, Kingdom of Bahrain 
Melchers, R.E., (2001), “On the ALARP Approach to 
Risk Management, Reliability Engineering and 
System Safety”, Vol. 71, pp. 201-208 
NORSOK N-004 (2013) “Design Of Steel Structures, 
Annex K Special Design Provisions For Jackets” 
OREDA (2002) “Offshore Reliability Database 
handbook”, 4th edition, DNV, Norway, 2002   
Project Management Institute (2008), “A guide to the 
project management body of knowledge (PMBOK 
Guide)”, Chapter 11 
Shafiee M., Dinmohammadi F., (2014), “An FMEA-
Based Risk Assessment Approach for Wind 
Turbine Systems: A Comparative Study of 
Onshore and Offshore”, Special Issue Wind 
Turbines  
WINDUSTRY (2014), “Why wind energy”, 
http://www.windustry.org/wind-basics/why-wind-
energy, (accessed May 15, 2014) 
8

 
Figure 1: Example of BBN network and results 
